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1 Introduction
Peter Achinstein is a professor of philosophy at Johns Hopkins University and a university
professor at Yeshiva University. He is generally regarded as one of the leading philoso-
phers of science. Achinstein is famous for his work on evidence, explanation, and real-
ism—the three topics with which the essays in this collection deal—but he is equally
famous for his work on the history of particle mechanics. In all his work, he combines
historical expertise with an unfailing sense for when formal precision is in place and with a
natural approach to conceptual analysis.
Achinstein is clearly a child of his time. He started publishing in the 1960s, a revolu-
tionary phase in the philosophy of science. At that time, it was generally thought that the
logical empiricists had led the philosophy of science into a cul de sac by overemphasizing
the importance of formalizing scientific theories in first-order predicate logic. A newer
generation of philosophers of science expected to make progress instead by paying close
attention to everyday scientific practice as well as to the evolution of science. Meanwhile,
ordinary language philosophy had become all the rage in analytic philosophy more gen-
erally. We see traces of these developments in all of Achinstein’s works, including the
essays collected in this volume.
In all essays in the present collection, there is attention to historical detail. In nearly all
of them, philosophical claims are supported in part by dint of examples taken from the
history of science. In some of the essays, historical case studies even figure as the main
evidence for the central claim defended in the essay; for instance, when Achinstein brings
to bear Jean Perrin’s experimental work on Brownian motion on the scientific realism
debate. Furthermore, there is a good deal of ordinary language philosophy to be found in
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2 Evidence
The first part of the book consists of five chapters which deal with philosophical problems
surrounding the notion of evidence. For the past two decades or so, Bayesian philosophy of
science has dominated the thinking about evidence. Bayesians have a purely formal and
entirely straightforward conception of evidence: E is evidence for a hypothesis H if, and
only if, the probability of H conditional on E is greater than the unconditional probability
of H. According to Achinstein, this account is too simple. In particular, it fails to do justice
to our common ways of talking and thinking about evidence. To simplify one of Achin-
stein’s arguments, suppose you are told that John is given one ticket in a fair 100-ticket
lottery, and Mary is given the remaining 99 tickets. From a Bayesian viewpoint, this is
evidence that John will win the lottery, for conditional on his being given a ticket the
probability that he will win is higher than it is unconditionally. But, if it is evidence for
anything, the said information is evidence that Mary will win the lottery—which would
seem to constitute evidence against John’s winning. This and similar considerations lead
Achinstein to propose a different definition of evidence. Or rather, he first distinguishes
between two different notions of evidence—potential and veridical evidence—and then
goes on to define them in ways that draw not only on probability theory (as does the
Bayesian definition) but also on the notion of explanation.
To solve the lottery problem, Achinstein requires that for something to count as evi-
dence for something else, the latter must be probable given the former, not (necessarily)
more probable. But that is still not enough. That Jim will not get pregnant is quite probable
given the fact that he takes the pill, yet his taking the pill is not evidence of his not getting
pregnant. To avoid this kind of problem, Achinstein adds as a necessary condition to his
definition that there be an explanatory connection between the putative evidence and the
hypothesis—or rather, for potential evidence, it has to be probable that there is such a
connection; for veridical evidence, it has to actually exist.
It might be thought that, while perhaps the thus defined notions of potential and
veridical evidence allow us to do justice to how we use the word ‘evidence’ in common
parlance, the Bayesian account of evidence might still be better suited for the purpose of
explaining how the same word is used in the practice of science. According to Achinstein,
however, that is not the case either. In one essay, he argues that the Bayesian account of
evidence as well as various other accounts that philosophers have proposed make little
contact with the practice of science. Not only are the notions of evidence offered by these
accounts too weak to be of any use in science, they are meant to apply on a priori grounds,
while—as Achinstein argues with two case studies—it is, or at any rate can be, rather an
empirical matter whether a given datum is evidence for a given theory.
In many ways, Achinstein’s work on evidence is conceptual analysis at its best. He
clearly has an ear sensitive to the subtly different ways in which we use the word ‘evi-
dence’. At the same time, the work demonstrates some potential pitfalls and limits of this
approach to philosophy.
People say all sorts of things. Should all these things be taken equally seriously? If not,
which not? For example, while we often use the word ‘evidence’ in a categorical sense—as
when we say that something is (or is not) evidence for something else—we also use it in a
graded sense, when we say that something is strong (or weak) evidence for something else.
And although in the above lottery case it may sound strange to say that the information that
99 of 100 tickets have been given to Mary and the remaining ticket has been given to John
is evidence (in the categorical sense) for John’s winning the lottery, perhaps it is not so
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strange to say that to an exceedingly low degree it is evidence for John’s winning the
lottery, whereas it is evidence for Mary’s winning the lottery to a very high degree.
Further, in philosophy it is rarely the case that linguistic intuitions point to precisely one
analysis of a given concept. We almost always have to arbitrate between different concept
explications on the basis of something other than data about language use. Carnap
famously proposed that such arbitration should take place on the basis of the so-called
theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and fruitfulness. I am not convinced that Achinstein’s
proposal offers the simplest way to make sense of the relevant linguistic data. For instance,
the purely probabilistic definition:
E is evidence for H if and only if both H is probable given E and H is more probable given E than it is
unconditionally.
will, as far as I can see, take care of all the problem cases that Achinstein adduces in favor
of his account. Obviously, it solves the lottery problem, and it also handles perfectly the
case of Jim’s likelihood of pregnancy: It is probable that Jim will not get pregnant given
that he takes the pill, but this is no more probable than that Jim will not get pregnant,
regardless of whether he takes the pill.
Achinstein presents a case (p. 38) that he might regard as a counterexample to this
proposal. In this case, you have the information that a person takes a medication that, with
a probability of .95, relieves certain symptoms. You then receive the information that he is
actually taking another medication, which relieves the same symptoms with a probability
of .9. According to Achinstein, the latter is still evidence for the claim that the person’s
symptoms will be relieved, even though it lowers the probability you assign to that claim.
I do not find this case compelling. You might compare the probability you now assign to
the said claim with the probability you assigned to it before you received the false
information that the person was taking the medication with a .95 chance of relieving the
symptoms and, for that reason, consider the second piece of information you received to
constitute evidence. Alternatively, you could grant that that piece of information is not
evidence but still a good reason to believe the person’s symptoms will be relieved—and
that that might fuel the intuition that it is evidence. Achinstein repeatedly emphasizes that
evidence gives good reason to believe, but one can agree while still holding that not every
good reason to believe something is evidence for the thing.
3 Explanation
The second part of Achinstein’s book consists of five essays devoted to explanation. The
logical empiricists had thought of explanation in logical terms, in that a certain logical
relationship had to obtain between two things for one to count as an explanation of the
other. In the 1960s, that thought had come to be regarded as being mistaken (along with
much else the logical empiricists had propounded). From that time on, theorists began
exploring different approaches to explanation. For instance, some proposed causal theories
of explanation, according to which explaining is the highlighting of causal relationships
(rather than logical relationships). In the early 1980s, Achinstein developed a theory of
explanation that focused on the act of explaining something to someone. Specifically, to
explain something is to make that thing understandable to someone.
As Achinstein notes, this makes explanation a context-dependent matter, given that
what exactly has to be done to make something understandable to someone may depend on
the interests and background knowledge of the person seeking understanding. In some
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contexts, highlighting logical relationships may be the key to making the person under-
stand. In other contexts, pointing at causal connections may do the job. And in still further
contexts, still other things may be called for. Moreover, because the act of explanation is
central to Achinstein’s theory, a person’s intentions matter in regard to whether or not he or
she explained something; if he or she had no intention of making something understand-
able to someone, then he or she did not explain the thing—even if he or she uttered words
that, as a matter of fact, made the thing understandable to the persons in his or her
audience.
It is fair to say that Achinstein’s work on explanation is no longer influential, due to a
large extent to criticisms leveled against it. It would have been a welcome addition to this
collection of essays if Achinstein had, perhaps in an appendix to some of the papers,
indicated why he believes the theory still stands (as apparently he does; else it would be
strange to have these essays reprinted without further comment).
4 Realism
The five essays in the third part of the book all revolve around the topic of scientific
realism. The scientific realism debate was one of the main debates in twentieth century
philosophy of science. The debate concerns the epistemological status of scientific theo-
ries. Do we have reason to believe that these theories, insofar as they are predictively
accurate, give a more or less faithful representation of unobservable entities and processes
underlying the phenomena, or should we remain agnostic on this matter? Scientific realists
believe that science is by and large successful in charting the unobservable part of the
world. By contrast, scientific antirealists hold that it must forever remain beyond our ken
whether science is successful in the aforesaid regard; what we can know, at best, is that
scientific theories save the phenomena.
Much of the discussion in this debate is of a rather abstract nature, focusing on such
relatively technical issues as underdetermination—frequently presented as a kind of log-
ical, or rather model-theoretic, problem—the truth-conduciveness (or otherwise) of the
theoretical virtues (simplicity, elegance, coherence with background theories, etc.), and the
confirmation-theoretic status of the rule called ‘inference to the best explanation’. Anti-
realists are typically motivated by the problem of underdetermination, that is, the problem
that even if the data favor precisely one of the theories on the table (which need not be the
case), there will be many other theories, possibly not (yet) conceived, that receive or would
receive equal or perhaps even stronger support from the data.
Realists tend to respond by invoking the theoretical virtues or, relatedly, the significance
of explanatory considerations. According to realists, such factors may be indicative of
truth, too, so that when the data alone do not warrant confidence in a given theory, the data
in combination with such additional considerations may well do so. In turn, antirealists
respond by questioning the epistemological significance of these additional considerations.
From their point of view, these considerations are, at most, of pragmatic value. For
instance, we favor simple theories because they are easier to understand and work with, not
because they have a greater likelihood of being true.
In his essays on realism, Achinstein also addresses most of these issues. However, he
manages to make them very concrete by discussing them in direct relation to specific
episodes in the history of science. A centerpiece in his defense of scientific realism is his
previously mentioned discussion of Perrin’s work on Brownian motion, which had led
Perrin to the conclusion that molecules, unobservable to the naked eye, exist. Whilst
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Perrin’s concerns were not philosophical in the first place, and whilst he did not consider
various objections that antirealists would certainly have raised against his conclusion,
Achinstein’s detailed study of Perrin’s work makes clear that Perrin’s work actually pre-
sents an enormous challenge for antirealists. Antirealists may be able to hold their position
in the face of Perrin’s findings, but in doing so, they will come to resemble the philo-
sophical skeptic who implores us to remain agnostic about the existence of an external
world in general (and not just the unobservable part of the world). In other words, their
position will come to appear academic and totally out of touch with what is actually going
on in science. That, at least, is how things appear after reading Achinstein’s essays on
scientific realism. I think that may be as far as anyone has gone in defending scientific
realism—and as far as anyone should care to go.
5 Conclusion
The book, or a selection of essays from it, could profitably be used as course material for an
advanced seminar in the philosophy of science. Parts would also make good reading
material for a more historically oriented course. For pedagogical purposes, a more
extensive introduction might have been helpful. In particular, it would have been good if
Achinstein had said more on how close the ties are among the three topics around which
this book is organized. For instance, how essential is Achinstein’s particular account of
explanation to his account of evidence, in which the notion of explanation plays a key role?
How crucial is Achinstein’s notion of evidence to the success of his arguments in support
of scientific realism? Spread throughout the book, one does find answers, or at least
pointers to answers, to these questions. Nonetheless, a more systematic discussion of the
connections would have been useful. That is a minor point of critique, of course. The book
is warmly recommended. It collects some of the best works of one of today’s most
significant thinkers on science.
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